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RECENT CHANGES IN THE RIGHTS AND 
DUTIES 01; BELLIGERENTS & NEUTRALS 
ACCORDING TO .INTERNATIONAL LAIV. 
LECTURE No. 1. 
WHEN I arranged with your Secretary sonic sis wecks ago to 
Ircturc on the rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents, I did not 
anticipate that the subject would have the living interest which it now 
possesses, that war between two grcat States would have broken out, 
would be running its course, and \vould have solved problems which I had 
intended discussing, and raised others of which I had then no thought. 
I shall not attempt to discuss all the many intcresting questions of inter- 
rintioiinl law raised by the cvcnts of the last month. Far less shall I scck 
to cover tlie entire field of belligerents' and neutrals' rights and duties-a 
subject on which whole libraries have been witten. AIy intention is 
much less ambitious ; it  is merely to point out some recent changes in 
parts of international law, and to invcstigatc the prcscnt direction of 
opinion. Studying the character of thcsc recent changes, !re may perhaps 
be able to form a surmise as to the future. 
International lair., as you are aware, consists of a collection of usages, 
practices, traditions, rules, and conventions, ncvcr fixed, though endeavours 
are constantly being made to stereotjpe this collection. Never was this 
state of transition more marked, ncver mere changes more rapid and 
frequent, than at present. International law is not a mere store-house of 
rules coming down from a far-off past ; it is a living and growing law ; 
some parts of it once important are in process of decay ; in other parts is 
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’is8 KIGIITS LIXD D U l I E S  OF IIELLKGEKEXTS AND NEUTKIII.S. 
life and the promise of it. International law has no recogniscd organ or 
mouthpiece-no Parliament or Congress to declare or amend its measures. 
Yet it atlvances-somctiiiics rapidly ; never more rapidly than to-day. 
By few espoundcrs of international law is sullicient notice taken of this 
clement of change. And so there is an international law known to 
soldiers, diplomatists, and men of affairs, and another partly obsolete but 
still taught in 6ooks. 
I do not merely refer to writers who crudely jumble together in fine 
confusion precedents drawn from antiquity and the events of yesterday, 
from Elizabeth’s reign and lTictoria’s, and who wander, to use Professor 
Cairnese’s expression, “ through the mazes of exploded systems and 
obsolete ideas.” Even 
expositors who were cscellent in their generation and who wrote with a 
nice sense of proportion, cease in a few years to be in touch with the 
opinions and facts moulding international law. No modern writer is held 
in greater esteem than Wheaton ; but many passages in the first edition 
of his work,publislicd in 1S3G, have as little relation to the ideas of our time 
as many of the dicta of l‘attcl or Puffendorf. FCTV irritcrs take suficient 
account of the declining authority of many prcccdcnts, the adoption 
of new standards of conduct, the appearance of new interests and forces, 
and what I may term a displacement of social values. Alany of the best 
of those treaties are written for a world which is not ours; a circumstance 
wliicli discredits international law in the eyes of men of tlic world \vl10, 
as diplomatists, or in position of military or naval command, seek its 
guidance. I am glad to bring bcforc this assembly this subject, chiefly 
because I am persuaded that, i f  international law is to retain, or, to be  
more exact, to regain its old authority, it must take into counsel more 
than it has done the soldier, the seaman, and the diplomatist. There has 
been a little too much spinning of cobwebs of the library, because the 
expositors of international law have not sulliciently collaborated with its 
administrators. 
One consequence of this state of change is the fact that jurists and 
writers on international law are not prepared as they once were with 
confident ansivers to questions often arising and calling for prompt 
decisions ; doubts prevail as to the validity of rules once deemed funda- 
mental; test-books speak with uncertain voice as to matters of the 
first moment; and there is a state of revolt against inany old precedents. 
Three or four great recent changes in international law may kc noted. 
All of them have affected the rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents. 
The first of these. changes has no  doubt lessened its authority of 
intcrnational Ian.. The older writers on the subject had a standard to 
which they appcaled in all their dillicultics. They asked themselves what 
the ‘ I  law of naturc” dictated to men-engagcil in warfare or diplomacy ; 
and for them the ansivcr given by this oracle, which was never dumb, was 
final. I t  is true that this I ‘  law of nature ” was sometimes a thin disguise 
for tlic passions of the hour. A sort 
of ventriloquism was practised; learned iiicnsecmcd to project their voices 
I allude to a venial and more cointiion failing. 
Often it sanctioned the worst abuses. 
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RIGIITS AXD DUTIES OF RELLIGERENTS A S D  SEUTKALS. $89 
some distance from themselves, and their voices came back to them as 
the utterances of the “lair of nature.” At best the “law of naturc” was 
only the shadow of men’s own conscience which imagination lengthened 
and magnified into a superior being, ever accompanying and guiding 
them. Often the phrase designated a school of philosophical thought 
dominant in the eighteenth century; of the same familyas the philosophy 
of the economists of last century. But, whatever its real nature, this 
“ law of nature ” lent authority to international law.’ 
Nearly a hundred years ago, at no  great distance from this place, Sir 
James AIackintosh delivered a course of lectures still remembered, on the 
Law of Nations ; and it is interesting to note the confidence with which 
he speaks of the poncr of this “ law of nature ”-“ a suprcnie, invariable, 
and uncontrollable rule of conduct to all men ”-to settle all disputes. The 
imperfections and ambiguity of the utterances of this oracle were long 
concealed from those who consulted it in a reverent and obedient spirit. 
To-day we have no such guides. A11 jurists have their doubts as to 
either the reality of the laiv of nature, or the possibility of ascertaining its 
precepts. This change has somen-hat diminished for the moment the 
influcnce of international law, which can no longer claini to be a system 
of law of higher authority and antiquity than any form of municipal Ian.. 
A minor change has been attentled by a similar result. The  early 
writers on international law turned in all their difficulties to the rules of 
Roman law, a system then almost universally accepted as the type- of 
perfect law. If an apt analogy were found in the Digest, its authority in 
regard to the law of prize, or booty, or modes of acquisition or the right 
of possession, occupation, or conquest mas not questioned, cscept by 
someone who fancied that he had found in the same storehouse of 
wisdom another analogy still aptcr. I n  Grotius and nynkcrshoeck-the 
latter probably by far the more acute mind cver dirdctetl to the science- 
this proneness to identify the. lam of nations with the lam of Rome is 
most. marked ; it still characteriscs some writers. On the whole, this 
influence was beneficial. True, Roman I& Contained no large principles 
directly applicable to public questions ; as to these it was meagre and 
imperfect ; it was the law of a people to whom war was the normal ordrr 
of things, who ivcre too powerful to take note of anything in the world 
escept themselves ant1 their enemies, ivho had no clear conception of 
neutrality, and for whom slavery was the foundation-stone of society. 
But Roman. private laiv was useful in giving forin to vague ideas ; ,the 
efforts of the jurists of last century to put many doctrines in thc guise of 
the language of the Digest, was conducive to precision. The principles 
to be found in the Institutes and the Digest as to the -sea being among 
‘the things common to nianliind, were favourable to freedom of navi- 
gation. They furnished arms for Grotius in arguing for a dhri. Lihcrtm. 
1 This is not the place in which to  examine the pliilosophical idens of the 
founders of international law. But I may hcrc refcr to Robcrt Zinimernlnnn’s 
brorhitrr “ Das Itcchtsprinzip Lei Leibnitz,” as particularly instructive on this 
point. 
. 
, .  . _  
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700 RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF IlELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRALS. 
They helped to settle tlic principle that “ the ocean is the public road of 
the 
All this is cliangcd. Roman law is no longer studied as it once was ; 
and the students of it would not claim-for it the asccndcncy which it once 
possessed in public and private affairs. To-day those most conversant 
with Roman law arc most aware of its limitations, and most struck by the 
incompatibility of many of its doctrines with the requirements of modern 
civilisation. 
Thesc two changes hare had one consequence, which I, as a lawyer, 
note with regret, but to which I cannot shut niy eyes. The influence of 
the jurist and of purely legal considerations in the development of inter- 
national law and especially as to the usages of war is distinctly less than 
it was. The old formulrc do not help to solvc the new problems arising 
in international law; for cxarnplc, such a question as that raised by the 
case of the “ Huascar.” Questions of disputed boundaries are settled 
by’ diplomatists with reference less to legal doctrines as to occupation 
than to the watershed and physical characteristics of the country. Once 
it was discovered that the “lam of nature” was either a shadolvy abstrac-- 
tion, or, in the words of Lord Somers, ‘‘ a wild uncertainty,” and that it was 
the passing opinion of the civilised worId on intcrnational questions, that 
Roman law Iiad no  right to speak as the voice of rcason and conscience 
as to the problems of peace and war, the  jurist lost for a time somc part 
of his influence. He spo1;e. as others, not as having authority; he was 
no longer the depository of the  sacred oracles; and he might be dis- 
regarded by diplomatists and commanders without sinning against tlic 
light. I shall be pardoned if I state that this is by no means a clear 
gain to the w d d .  I t  is the fashion nowadays, especially among r e p -  
scntatives of tlic school known in Germany as “ military realism ”-a 
I school of writers of whom I shall have something to say-to disparage 
thc labours of jurists in this field. I vcnturc to think that their influence 
has been greatly beneficent. If war is morz humane than it was, if some 
cruel practices havo been weeded out or discredited, it  is largely due 
to the teaching of jurists \die havc striven to carry law into the very 
hcart of disorder, and to find a basis of reason for thc impulses of 
humanity. Stoirell, Marshall, Kent, Lushington, Portalis, and Kiri$s- 
down, were the voices of the educated conscience of their times, and thcy 
laboured not in vain to elevate the actual usages of war into accordancc 
\vit!i higher ideals. No onc can be familiar with the great historical 
controversies of last century and this as to neutral and beliigercnt rights 
without feeling that the influence of jurists made for peace, humanity, and 
civilisation. If I am not mistaken, \re may discern from time to time in 
modern diplomacy some evil effects of the decline-tcmporary, it is 
probable-in the influencc of the expositors of international law. Public 
questions are discussed with a certain cynical avowal of the principle that 
might makcs right, that “ blood and iron ” count for much more than the 
1 Jenkinson’s “ Discourse on the Conduct of thc Govcrnnwnt of Grcnt Britain 
in rcspcct to Ncutral Nations,” 11. vi. 
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RIGHTS AND DUTIES 01: nELLIGERENTS AX’D NEUTRALS. 791 
la\\, of nations, that the line of contlwt of one S t3k  to another is to 
be determined by their relative military and naval strength, and that all 
other colisiderations arc vain sentiments. 
‘rime does not permit me to specify all the recent changes in inter- 
national law. I n  all the early test-writers 
the doctrine of the equality of States, irrespective of strength, was laid 
tlo\vll. Ilot this phrase was used along with language of R very different 
character. With more or less instability since the Peace of ~l%stphalia, and 
certainly since the Treaty of lTicnna there had prevailed a conception of 
a normal political order in Europe, which it iras criminal to disturb. 
Statesmen professed to act-even if they did not in truth al\vays act-in 
accordance with a ccrtain droif P d l i c  e i i r o f h ,  of which the chief masims 
\rere these: that peace is the normal condition of things; that States 
are independent of each other and in all respects equal ; and that no State 
has the right to interfere in the altjirs of another unless its security is 
affected. To these rules and maxims what may be  termed the ohcia1 
{vritcrs appealed with confidence that they ivould not be questioned. 
Could we say as much to-day ? Could we have said as much any ti&c 
during the last twenty years ? 
Often during the last fifty years has the principle of nationality come 
into collision with some of these masinis-les masimrs  esseaIieIIes el incon- 
/rs/ies dtr dt-oif ptr6Zic e~it-o)t!eiz.~ The  political aspirations of several races- 
Italians, Germans, Hungarians, and others-proved irreconcilable with the 
order of things which diplomacy had established. Nowadays the doctrine of 
the equality of States is pronounced to be virtually obsolete. A fiction in 
one sense that doctrine always was ; Switzerland did not count for so much 
as France. The  doctrine is in fact part of an  obsolete system of political 
philosophy ; according to Wolff and his populariscr, Vattcl, each nation 
lived in a state of nature, each nation was entitled to the same rights, just 
as all men, whatever their stature, are entitled to the  same rights. Thc 
doctrine slurred over difficulties as to what communities are independent 
States. But it cmphasised the fact that international law was a collection 
of rules applicable to all complete or sovereign States ; and that just as 
private law assumes equality be twen the individuals under its sway, so must 
international law assume the equality of States. I t  mas another way of say- 
ing that they were independent. According to tlie theory of the balance 
of power, or what Kinglake terms the “ great usage,” there Jvas an inner 
circle of States with larger authority than thosc outside it. The formation 
of these political unions has shaken the doctrine of the  Equality of States, 
the foundation-stone of the international law of Grotius and Vattel. The  
sharp line of distinction drawn by earlier writers between Christian and 
non-Christian communities no longer csists. The .older writers on inter- 
national law speak of it as espressing solely the  usages of Christian States. 
Lord-Stowell was accustomed to refer to comniunitics outside that circle 
or pale, much as Lord Coke, about two centuries before, spoke of Turks 
as heathens-much as tlie Greeks about twenty ccnturicc earlier spoke’of 
I can alltlde only to one or t\vo. 
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705 RIGIITS A S D  D U f I E S  OF IIELLIGEKESTS ASD S E U T R A L S .  
barbarians. Turkey has becn 
Persia 
antl Sinin arc in much closer relation to us than thcy wcrc. Japan, with 
her rapid assimilation of Western civilisation, and with the abolition 
of consular jurisdiction, has takcn hcr place among tlic communities 
within the region of international Ian-. Iiistcad of a concert of nations 
based on a common religious system, thcrc is one based on a common 
civilisation. 
It has protlucctl a ncw form of 
intderance. I t  has apparently sanctioned the csclusion of non-ciuilised 
coniniuiiitics from the purview of international law. I t  has encouraged 
the idca that the advance of civilisation condones all things; and it 
lids sanctioned an attitude to\vartls unciviliscd raccs akin to that assuiiicd 
by Jew to Gentile, Grceli to IJarbarinn. A ncw chapter in intcrnational 
law-a chaptcr ~vhicli will recognise and dcfinc tlic duties of civiliscd 
coininunities to uiicivilised or savagc raccs--n.ill, pcrhaps at  no distant 
date, be written. Some lilies of it are already pcn;icd. The Berlin and 
Ilrusscls Confercnccs, in spiic of thc meagre results attained, gave the 
promisc of bcttcr things. 
I should not have coinplcted thc list of important changcs-I am not 
sure that I should not have oniittctl the most important of them-if I did 
not refer to what had becn called tlie spirit of “military rcalisni,” a 
spirit ivhich finds eloquent. expression in much of the bcst military 
literatme of Gcrmany, for esamplc, in the writings of Clause\vitz Ant1 
voii Hartmann ; a spirit of distrust and antagonisin to the intrusion 
of law into regions in which the soldier is antl must be, it is said, a law 
unto himsclf; a belief that not thc law of nations but military ncccssiiy 
must detcrrninc what is Ia\vfiil and what is not in mrfarc. 
RIuch of this long preface may sceni to bc rcniotc from tlic question 
of rcccnt changes in the rights and dutics of iicritrals antl belligercnts. 
But I belicvc tlie above considcrations will hclp us to distinguish the 
living international latv from that which, though still to be found in 
books, is dcad, or dying, and enable us to see more clearly the prcscnt 
trend of opinion. 
In  dealing with the chicf reccnt chaiigcs ivliich have takcn placc in 
international law, I take as the starting-point the close of tlie war with 
Russia, which was, in fact, thc bcginning of a n c ~  cra in the laws of war. 
For the sake of convcniencc, I hnvc tlivitlcd tlic topics of discussion into 
tn’o classes : those chiefly affecting war a t  sca ; those affecting war on land. 
I n  1S56, thc great Powcrs issued thc Dcclaration of Paris, of which 
\ye havc licard much latcly. ‘I’hc history of the Declaration is still 
shrouded in some mystery. Neither Lord Clarendoii nor Lord Conlcy, 
the diplomatists most dircctly conccrncd, gave a full account of thc 
negotiations ; the only dctailcd statement is one published by 31. 
Drouyri de Lhuys, who was French Foreign hIinister at the time.’ 
AccortIing to that stitenicnt-and it was bornc out, by the remarks which 
1 SCC nppciidis to report of Sciitrnlisntion Conl!nission. 
I n  this respect a change has taken placc. 
. formally admitted into thc group of European Polxcrs sincc 1856. 
That change is not all for the good. 
- 
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KIGH’I‘S ASD DUrIES OF l:ELI,LGEI<EXTS Ah’D SEUTRALS. 793 
fell from Lord Clarendon-the Declaration mould have becn made by 
the bulk of civilised States, whether we had acceded to it or not. The 
Emperor, Napoleon III., had then many humanitarian ideas in his mind ; 
one of the id& ATzpoZionhs was the mitigation of the evils of maritime 
war, an idea, prominent we know, in his uncle’s memoirs. 
The  first principle which the Declaration of Paris enunciated was : 
6‘ Privateering is abolished.” When privatcering began I do not know.’ 
AIartens, in his Essay on Privatecring, traces it back to the end of the 
fourteenth or the beginning of the sisteciith century. It is not long 
since even the  subjects of neutral States sought and obtained from bel- 
ligerents letters of marque, enabling them to capture vessels of countries 
with which their own was at peace. I n  our wars with France and 
America, letters of marque were issued freely by all belligerents ; and 
there is no doubt that these privateers committed ,great depredations 
on our mercantile m? rinc . :- 
“ I n  the last great war, li93-1S15, our Admiralty issucd 10,000 lctters of 
marque, yet despite that vaat addition to  odr naval strength, xve lost close on 
10,033 ~nerchant-vcsscls, and we captured but 1,033 of the enemy’s privateers.”- 
Norman’s ‘ 6  Corsairs of France,” p. vii. 
“ i n  tlic space of 40 years, 4,313 prizes were sold by the Adiniralty Court 
at Donkirk for the sum of fG,337,000 ; 34,550 prisoners during that period were 
detained for various ternis in that town. In  the single year 1751, 051 English 
prizes were carried into lhnkirk.”-Zbid., p. 01. 
‘ I  It appears that from the commencement of the war  with France in July, 
li76, to the following Xay, that is a period of ten months, the value of the prizes 
taken by Liverpool ships alone amounted to ~1,02j,GUO.”-Lxughton’s “Studies in 
Saval History,” p. 905. 
Many restrictions were placed on the owners and captains of 
privateers with a view to prevent certain abuses to which they wcrc: 
prone. By the ordinances of most States, the owners were required to 
cnter into bonds for their good behaviour. According to English usages, 
privateers were required not to hoist any jacE, pennant, or ensign usually 
borne by King’s ships. In spite of the precautions to ensure the good 
conduct of private,ers, thcy acquired R bad reputation. The  oficcrs and 
men \verc bound by no rules of professional honour. The  oficcra of the 
Navy found fault with them ; they were accused of being iiiorc eager 
for plunder than for fighting; and they rarely, if ever, affected. the 
results of any war. I t  is well known that Nelson and Codrington 
condenined the conduct of these “ lawless libertines ” as nothing short of 
piracy.’ In the American Civil War, the South had thought of issuing 
See as to origin of privatecriog I’asquale Fiore, 0,330 ; Shephard’s “Capturc 
of Private Property at Sea,” p. GT AIartens (Essay on  Privatecring, p. 1) 
defines privatecring as “ the cspedition of private individuals during war, who, 
being provided with a special permission from one  of the bclligcrcnt Powers, fit 
out a t  their o\vn espensc one  or more vessels \vitli the principal design of attack: 
i n g  the cneniy, and preventing neutral subjects or friends from carrying on with 
the enemy a comniercc regarded as illicit.” 
S m  Professor Laughton’s “ Studies in Sxval History” as to privateers. 
He cites, p. 190, the remark of Ncl.-on, ‘ I  The conduct of all privateers is, as far as 
I Iiave seen, so near piracy that I only wonder any civilised nation can allo\v 
thenl.” 
\‘or,. SLII .  3 A  
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
CU
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 1
8:3
2 2
3 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
CU
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 1
8:3
2 2
3 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
RIGHTS ASD DUTIES OF DELLIGEKENTS A S D  NEUTRALS. 795 
the abandonment of the right to seize enemy’s goods in neutral bottoms 
Seems exceedingly obscure ; and if I put fornard certain conclusions, it is 
with distrust as to any solution of a problem depending on several uncertain 
elements. I n  the first place, it is not clear that we could have prevented 
a general affirmation by the civilised world of the principle “ free ships 
make free goods.” I t  is not clear. that we could hare maintained our 
ancient principle without provoking the hostility of neutral nations, and 
it is still less clear that \re could now rescind what w c  did in 1856, and 
freely exercise in IS98 against the whole world invidious rights which the 
victories of Nelson enabled England to assert in 1SOG. Captain Mahan’s 
nords on the point are not without value :- 
“ I n  her secure and haughty sway of the seas, England imposed a yoke on 
tieutrals which will newr  again be borne; and the principle that the flag covers 
the goods is forever secure."--" The Influence of Sea. Power on History,” p. S i .  
Xcutrals count for more than they did when our fleets enforced the 
doctrine “ enemies’ ships make enemies’ goods.” Thc belligerent must 
take account of their feelings and convenience to a degree unknown in 
the Napoleonic wars, if there is not to be another “armed neutrality” 
more formidable than ‘the armed neutrality of 1780 and 1800. I t  is 
significant that at the beginning of the present war English and Gcrman 
shipoivncrs resented the idea of their ships being stopped and overhauled 
in search of belligerents’ goods. Suppose that England being at  war with 
Germany, our cruisers insisted on overhauling every American or French 
liner in search of German goods, and brought mail-steamers into Dover, 
Southampton, or Portsmouth in order to examine the cargo and ship’s 
‘papers, and to open the mail bags. \\’odd not such a course lead to 
complications?’ Xo doubt the immunity from capture of goods in 
neutral bottoms would operate as a premium or  a preferential duty in 
their favour; but nhat would be its amount? How far it would cause a 
transfer of our ships to foreign flags is doubtful. The laws of several 
countries put impediments in the way of such transfers. The  results of 
the captures by the “Alabama” and her consorts are, it is said, no 
certain guide to the experience of future maritime wars ; the “Alabama” 
captured sailing-vessels taking definite trade routes ; cruisers in the 
future may not hare the same luck in regard to steamers able to take any 
routcs and inakc any detours they please. 
To those who speak of the Declaration of Paris as a surrender made 
per iiiitwitzi/i and who dread a wholesale transfer of British mercantile 
marine to neutral flags, Professor Westlake points out that this opinion 
‘The point may be put in the words of the late Field-JInrshal Burgoyne 
(“Life and Correspondence,”?, 503) :-“Suppose a fine tncrchantnian (belonging to 
a neutral Statc)such as IVC have navigating from Europe to India and Australia, 
with ;I moderate ustial nrnmanment, to be ~ n c t  at sea by a small man-of-war of a 
belligerent, of really very inferior force, is that going to allow itself to be detained 
and searched or  pcrbaps taken possession ofns a prize by :I d x a r f ?  The doctrine 
of the Solicitor-General would imply yes. But i t  is contrary to human nnturc to 
ruppose that such a Iaiv would be submittcd to.” 
\\’estlalie’s “ International Lam,” p. 930. 
3 x 2 
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does not take “ sufficient account of the immcnsc aggregate of thc prices 
which mould have to be paid for wholesale bond-jde transfcrs of British 
sli’ips, an  sggresatc far cscceding d i a t  neutral buyers could supply on 
short notice ; or the fact that transfers which irere not bonti-jde \vould not 
be valid against a belligerent ; and of the  necessary conscquencc from 
these two premises, namely, that an enemy n-odd bring in the transferred 
ships wholesale for inquiry by their Prize Courts into the circumstances 
of thc transfcr. X great rush to transfcr would be follon-ed by the 
discovery that war rates of. insrirance \\-ere heavy even undcr the neutral 
I speak with diffidcncc on this subject, and I ndniit that there 
might be naval ivars in which it would be prudcnt to revcrt to thc old 
rule. \\'hilt lve are neutrals, lioivcver-and ive gcncrally are such-tlie 
principle “ frcc ships niake frec goods” is to our advantage; n~!d 
probably \vc must accept it, for better or worse, as a permanent part of 
maritime law. 
I agree u-ith 
-those who, like that univcaried advocate of reform in maritime law, tlie 
late IIr. Danson, hold that private property other than contraband ought 
to be secure from capture at sea-at all events, that the practice as to 
capture at sea should be assimilated to the practice on I‘md. 
For all concerned, but especially for England, which stands to lose 
most, it  would probably have been well if the offer held out last century 
by Jefferson and Franklin, and repeatccl by the United Statcs in 1566 and 
1S70, to esempt such property from capture, had been acccptcd. 
I do not propose to trouble 
you ivith figures or diagrams. You all ~ I I O W  Nelson’s Column ; notc the 
figure on the top ; that will roughly represent the total value of exports and 
imports at the time when tlic great Admiral livcd arid fought. 
length of the Column itself will represent the recent value of our exports 
and imports. Of the increase in our shipping, and of tlie share of the 
shipping of the world which ire l idd  at the beginning of the ccntury, it is 
impossible to speak with confidence ; therz are no trustworthy statistics. 
as to the earlicr datc, and comparisons- are deceptivc. n u t  you may 
picture the total tonnage of the n-orld by the total length of the Column,. 
and about one-half of that represents I3ritish tonnage. 
It is important to bear in mind that the capture of private property 
at  sea docs not seem to have appreciably affected the result of any great 
jvar. Trafalgar, thc battles of the Baltic and the Nile, the campaign in 
Russia, the Peninsular War and \\’atcrloo, w r e  decisive-not the cap- 
tures of French schooners or Spanish galleons. They enriched and 
flag.” 
No doubt thc present state of things is anomalous. 
Consider the extent of our commerce. 
. 
The total- 
I t \  shipoxvner of great sagacity and experience, writing to m e  of  the transfers 
o f  Britishships which would take place i n  tlie cvent o f  our bcingat  war, remarks : 
“The transfer would not, I think, be permanent. It- ~ o u l d  still be British 
capital \vIiicIi would work the business, and its control would be secured, in 
~ 0 1 1 1 ~  way, say by mortgages. . . . . \\‘hen we had clenrcd the sexs of the 
cnemy’s cruisers, and still more \\-hen the war \\-as over, we should be b : ~ k  in our 
position of  being the p r i n c i l ~ ~ l  carriers by sen." 
. 
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denioralised a few owners of privateers ; they ruined individnnls hcrc 
and there; wars ran their course, while privateers burned, sank, and 
destroyed. There is, too, something incongruous and untlignified in t h t  
accounts which we have had lately of the  fleet of a great Power “bailing 
up” or “sticking up’’ small schooners or brigs laden with molasses or 
pottery. Further, the liability to capture private property is to be 
regretted, because it is out of harmony with the practice observed in 
modern times in civilised warfare on land. No one has put more im- 
pressively than Napoleon the antithesis between the  two modes of warfare- 
no one has insisted more emphatically-on the fact that the methods of 
nicdixval times, which did not spare the non-combatants, still linger 
at sea. Cobdcn often expressed the same idea, but not with the dircct- 
iicss, felicity, fcrvour, or authority of Napoleon ;I mhcther he acted on 
his own masims is beside the point :- 
“ Le tlroit dcs gens, dam Ics siL:cles de barbaric, h i t  le nidnie sur terrc que sur 
riier. Lcs individus dcs nations enncmics dtaierit faits prisonniers, soit qu’ils 
eusscnt Ctd pris Ics arnics :‘i la main, soit qii:ils fussent dcs siniplos habitants ; 
c t  its tic sortaient d’dcliange qu’cn payant u n c  ratyon. Les propri8tds niobilihres, 
e t  nidme fonciL:res, Ctaicnt conSsquCes, en tout 011 en partic. La civilisation s’cst fait 
sentir rapidcnicnt et n cntihement chang6 le droit des gens clans la giierre tle terrc; 
sans avoir le inCmc effet clans celle d e  mer. De sortc quc, comnie s’ily avait deux 
raisons c t  dcux justiccs, lcs choses sont reglkes pardeuxdroits tliff6rens. Ledroitdcs 
gens, dnns In guerre de terre, n’entmine plus le depouillement des particuliers ni 
tin changcmcnt dans l’6tat des personnes. La guerre n’a action que sur le gouverne- 
ment. Ainsi Ics propriktks ne chnngent pas de mains, les magasins t ~ e  
niarchandises restcnt intacts, les personnes restent librcr. Sont seulement con- 
sid6r6s coninic prisonnicrs de guerre Ics individus pris Ics arnies h la main, e t  
faisant pnrtic dc corps niilitairc. Cc cliangeiiient n beaucoup tliminu6 lcs inaux 
de la guerre. I1 a reiidu la conquGte d’une nation plus facile, In gucrrc moins 
snnglnnte e t  moins d h s t r e u s c .  Une province conquise prdtc sernient, ct, si le 
vainqueur l’esige, donne des Otages, rend les armes, les contributions se 
porqoivent au .profit du vainqucur, qui, s’il le juge nCccssnire, &tablit line con- 
tribution estraordinairc, coit pour pourvoir h l’entrcticn dc son nrinc‘c, soit 
pour s’indemniscr lui-mGme des dc‘penses quc lui a caus4cs la guerrc. .\Inis 
cette contribution n‘a aucuii rapport avec la valeur dcs marchandises en  
magasin ; c’est sculcnicnt u n e  augmentation proportionncllc plus 011 moins forte 
cle la contribution ordinaire. Rarement cette contribution c‘quivaut h une  nnnkc 
de celles que percoit lc prince, et  ellc est impos6c s u r  I’univcrsnlit6 de I’ktat ; 
de sorte qu’elle Ii’eiitrainc janiais In ruinc d’aucun particulier. 
Le droit des gens qui rCgit In guerre maritime est restd d a m  toute sn bnrbarie. 
Lcs proliri6t6s des particuliers sont confisqudes ; Ics individus non-conibnttants 
sont faits prisonniers. Lorsque d c u s  nations sont en guerre, tous les bitiriients 
de I’unc 011 de l’autre, naviguant sur les mers, ou existant clans les ports, sont 
susceptibles d’Ctrc confisqu&s, et Ies individus .? bord de ccs bitiments sont faits 
prisonnicrs de guerre. Ainsi, par une contradiction bvidcnte, un b9ti11ient atiglais 
(dGns l’hypoth&se d’une guerre entrc la France e t  I’Angleterre) qui se trouvera 
dans 1c port tle Kantes, par exemple, nu moment de In dc‘claration de gucrrc, sera 
eoiifisqub ; lcs hommes h bord seront prisonniers tle gocrrc, quoiquc non-com- 
battants c t  simples citoyens ; tantlis qu’un magasin d e  marchandiscs anglniecs, 
appnrtennnt A des Anglais dans la nidme vil!e, n c  sera ni s6questrd ni confisqub, 
e t  que Ics nkgociants anglais voyageant en France ne seront point prisonnicrs de 
I ‘‘ AIdmoires pour scrvir, etc.” 1’01. 2, p. 97. 
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guerrc, e t  recevront lcur itin6raire et  les pnsseports idcessaires pour quitter le 
territoire. UII bftiment. naviguant et saki par UII vaisseau frnnqais, sefa confisq;ik, 
quoique sa cnrgnison appxrtienrie a dcs particuliers ; les individus trourbs !I bord 
tle ce U;^climent seront prisonniers d e  guerrc, quoique non-conibnttants ; et un 
convoi de cent charettes de marchandises, appartenant des Anglais, ct traver- 
sant la France, au moment dc In rupture entre les deus puissances, nk sera  pas 
saisi. Dans l i  guerre de terrc, les proprift& m h e  territoriales que possedent 
des sujets &angers, nc sont point soumises ?I confiscation.” 
I t  is possible that this passage exaggerates tlie contrast between the 
two modes of warfare; thc statements as to the immunity of property on 
land are of the nature of counsels of perfection.’ But a real contrast 
esist s. 
In  stating the objections to the difference between the treatment of 
private property on land and that of similar property on sea, one cannot 
lose sight, of the fact that exemption froiii capture on sea is probably for 
a long time to come out of the question. Such exemption would be in 
war to the supreme advantage of England, which stands to lose so much. 
I t  would therefore be to the disadvantage of our opponents. We cannot 
hope that other nations knowing our  n-eak spot will relinquish this right. 
- T h e  Declaration of Paris did not deal with contraband of war. As to 
this in recent years, neither here nor elsewhere has there been any distinct 
change. There still prevail two distinct policies on the subject-on the 
one hand, thc Continental system, according to which a definite list of 
articles is declared contraband; on the other hand, the English and 
American policy, which rccognides as contraband of war a fluctuating class 
of articles known as conditionally contraband, and liable to seizure accord- 
ing to their destination. The indefiniteness of tlie latter policy causes 
shippers and merchants mudli inconvenience, and the tendency of some 
of the latest decisions has been to increase the dificulty of merchants. 
They had a tolerably clear guide then when they knew that a destination 
to R belligerent port was of the very essence of contraband. Coal con- 
veyed in a neutral vessel to a neutral port could not be contraband in a 
war betn-een France and Germany, even if it probably would be conveyed 
overland to a French or German port, and there put on board a belligerent 
cruiser. In view of a series of decisions of tlie American Prize Courts 
during tlie Civil War, the question is no longer so simple as it oncc was. 
Developing doctrines put forward by Lord Stowell at a time wlien he was 
espounding the lair- of nations much to the  disadvantage of neutrals, the 
American Coiirts laid it down that cargo on its voyagc to a neutral port 
might be seized on that voyage if it was intended to tranship the cargo 
at such neutral port for a belligerent port. “ If the ulterior destination 
(of the cargo)-is the kno\m inducement to the partial voyage, and the ship 
Contrast the above passage with Clausewitz’s description of Xapoleon’s 
methods. “ On II‘nr.” Book 5, c .  14. The best historical account of the right of 
capture is “ Bluntschli’s ‘I Das Beuterecht in? Krieg.” 
The late Lord Iddesleigh once remarked that the best reason held for tnnri- 
time plunder was that given by Sir James Mackintosh, viz., that plunder by sea 
was niore out of sight and caused less indignation than  plunder by land, but that 
this reason was a bnd’one. 
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is engaged in the latter with a view to the former, then whatever liability 
may attach to the final voyage must attach to the earlier, undertaken with 
the same cargo and in continuity of conveyance.” Pushing the doctrine 
of I ‘  ulterior destination ” a step further, the Supreme Court sanctioned 
in the case of the Petcrlioff ” I  the seizure of a cargo on a voynge from 
London to AIatamoros, a neutral port on the Alexican side of the Rio 
Grande, on the ground that part of the cargo, artillery harness, artillery 
boots, etc., was to be conveyed overland to Wilmington or Charleston in 
the Confederate States. ‘ I  It is true,” remarked the Court, “that even 
these goods, if really intended for sale in the market of AIatamoros, 
ivould be free of liability, for contraband may be  transported by neutrals 
to a neutral port, if intended to make part of its general stock of trade. 
nu t  there is nothing in the case which tends to convince us that such was 
their real destination, while all the circumstances indicate that these 
articles, at least. were destined for the iise of the rebel forces then 
occupying Broimsville, and other places in the vicinity.” 
It  must be conceded that but for the theory of continuous voyages 
blockades may be easily evaded in these days of developed railway 
communication. None the less is a new chain on neutral commerce 
forged by those decisions. Not a cargo of goods of any possible iise to 
an,army or  fleet can safely be shipped to Jamaica or other islands adjoin- 
ing Cuba if the doctrine of (‘ continuous voyages” be rigorously acted 
upon. W e  may however, perhaps, in this war, hear‘little of that doctrine.2 
-4 characteristic of the naval operations in this war, so far. has been a 
desire to study the interests of neutrals, and not to press too far the claims 
of beiligerents. 
No Prize Courts have in recent years sat in this country ; and there 
have been no examples of their decisions. When they go to work we 
shall see them applying doctrines and principles of a startling character 
and highly unfavourable to neutrals ; doctrines and principles formed, and 
‘ I  standing interroiatories ” drawn lip, at a time when belligerents were a 
law unto themselves. To name one anomaly, the Prize Courts are 
accustomed to .act on certain rules as t o  the ownership of ships and 
property, which cut the knot of inany tlifficiilties but do not exactly solve 
them. One such is that goods iii tii7tisifn on the ocean are presumed to 
belong to the consignee ; another is that property is presumed to rcniaiii 
in the same hands from the time it is shipped until delivery, ant1 that 
transfers of property during the voyage are not recognised. The object 
of these rules was clear ; they are wholly at variance with the facts of 
modern commerce. The  ground of the dockrine was explained by the 
Prize Council in Soretisoti v. The Queen (11 Moore, P. CC., p. 146) :- 
“ T h e  difficulty of detecting frauds if mere paper transfers are held sufhient  
is so great that the Courts have laid it down as a general rule that such transfers 
without actual delivcry shall be insufficient.” 
‘ 50  U.S. 2s. See  Hobbs and Hennery I7 C.B. 791. 
See  the case  of the ‘I Doclwijk” during the Italian-Abyssinian U’ar, Rc-Jrte dc 
Droit Infentnliottnl, 1S97, p. GG. It now appcars (Ju,ne 30th) that complaints are 
being made that Janinica is being used as a basis o f  supplies for the Spanish 
troops in Cuba.-Z‘ivzcs, June 30th, 189s. 
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Even in the days of Lord Stoivell the most that could be said for the 
above rules iv+s that they did not always work injustice; to-day they 
n.ould be too rough to be tolerated. I n  a single parcel of goods, half-a- 
dozen interests may be concerned. If a vessel carries a general cargo it 
would puzzle the mozt experienced lawyer to say in whom was the oivncr-, 
ship of all the goods, or the most acute economist to say on whom the, 
loss \vould fall. 
That the Prize Court should be  a l ~ a y s  the Court of the belligerent 1 
State ; that the nation which has seized the property of neutrals, or is 
interested in condemning it, shonld give a decision binding their 
property and rights ; th i t  neutrals should have no voice in the matter-. 
that also is an anomaly, but one too deeply rooted to be removed in o u r  
time. 
A word may here bc said ,as to a point on whicli confusion prevails. 
Members of Parliament lately asked the- Government again and again 
whether they intended to prohibit the exportation of contraband. The 
Crown has power wider the Customs Act, 157’3,’ to prohibit the esporta- 
tion of certain kinds of contraband, a power which it rarely cxcrciscs, and 
only in the event of thc interest of thc State being concerned. An armed 
vessel may be contraband, ?nd as such ,  punishable, and the fitting of i t ,  
out may also be an infringement of the Foreign Enlistment Act. I3ut 
speaking generally, there is no powcr to prohibit the exportation of 
contraband ; the risk of capture is the only penalty. 
Neutrality, according to modern international law, is not merely doing 
in war what a State does in peace. Neutrality involves distinctive duties. 
I t  is curious to note how late the true conception of neutrality appears, 
how imperfect it is in its inception, how slowly it matures. The  Romans 
had no idea of neutrality ; they might enter into offensive or defensive 
alliances with other States ; they did not understand a state of indifference 
or neutrality. I n  the Niddlc Ages it was common for the subjects of 
States at  peace with one another to take service with one belligerent or 
with both. Scholars h a w  discovered here and there traces of the idea ; 
but the notion ivas rudimentary. I t  strikes one as strange that an 
enlightened reformer such as Sir James AIackintosh should have opposed 
the first Foreign Enlistment Act as an infringement of the rights of the 
neutral. Even in modern definitions of neutrality it was assumed that 
neutral nations should continue to do in time of peace \v!iat they had 
clone in war.’ . In  his incisive way Napoleon observes :-“ L‘Etat dc guerre 
1 Thc Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1Sj9, s. 8 (40 and 43 \’ict. c. 21), 
allows the pro11ibitio11, by order in council, of tlic exportation of arms, 
ammunition, gunpowder, military stores, etc. 
2 The great seamen of Elizabcth’s reign, the Drakes, Hawkins, ctc., did very 
niucli’ as they pleased towards Spanish ships and possessions even in time of pence. 
So long as the actual territory of x Statc was not violated no act  of \var was 
necessarily committed. Under cover of reprisal, the commerce of a friendly State 
niiglit be harried, to almost a n y  cxtent without a final breach of thc peacc, and 
Elizabeth seems to h a w  favoured the doctrinq that Colonies beyond the seas were 
in the same category asa mercantile Innrinc.-Corbett’s “Tudor Seamen,” vol. l . ,  
1’. 19.2. 
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nc peut avoir aucune influencc sur les neutrcs; its doivent donc fairc, en 
guerre, ce qu’ils peuvent faire pendant la pais.” Napoleon did not con- 
ceive that war imposed new duties on  neutrals, and that they might not 
be free to do certain things, laivful and customary in time of peace. To 
the United States, and primarily its great citizens Jefferson and Franlilin, ’ 
is due the first dcparture from the old idea and the recognition of the 
modern. The American Foreign Enlistment Act of 1794, prohibited the 
enlisting of soldiers in the United States. I t  also prohibited the fitting 
out of espeditions against friendly States. T h e  dificulty then felt, 
and not yet solved, was, how to reconcile this policy x-ith the undoubted’ 
riglit of private traders to sell arms and munitions of war to belligerents, 
subject to the risk of confiscation as contraband ; n right which Congress 
ivas not inclined to abandon ; ivhich the United States asserted against 
France in 1SDG ; a right which England, in nnsn-er to the remonstrances of 
Russia, refused to surrender or impair in 1870. “ Our citizcns,” said 31r. 
Jefferson, i n  an oft-cited passage, “ have always been frcc to make, vend. 
and export arms. I t  is thc constant occupation and livelihood of some 
of them. To suppress their calling, the only means perhaps of thcir 
existence, because a war esists in foreign and distant countries in which 
we hayc no concern, noultl scarcely be espcctcd.” And so, in pursuancc 
of this policy, the sale of mnnitions of war was permitted ; and the 
Xmcrican Courts held that the sale of n fully-equipped cruiser to a 
I belligerent n.as not necessarily an offence against the  Foreign Enlistment 
.let. 
The English Act of l S l 9  \ v x  formed on the lines of the American 
Xct ; and when our Courts came to’ apply it  to the  vessels .built in this 
country for the Confederate Government, they took the same view of the 
law as the American Coiirts. In the famous “ Alexandra ” case tried 
in lSG2 (“ Attorney-General it. Sillem”) Xr. Pollock, C.B., held “ tha t  it 
was no offence to build for and sell and to deliver to one of the belligerents . 
a fully-arni-ed ship.” The  Act was not framed to malie any difference 
between ships-of-war and guns, ammunition, and other implements of war, 
but to prevent our shores from being made the points of departure of 
hostileespeditions, commissioncdand equipped to commit hostilitiesagainst 
a belligerent not at war with us.” 133rOl l  B r a m d l  tool; the same view : 
“ The section prohibits that equipment only which is itself such that by 
means of it the vessel can commit hostilities, and no equipment which 
gives no means of attack and defence is within section 7.” A ship may 
sail from 3 port ready to receive on board ivarlikc equipment ; that cquip- 
ment may leave in another vessel, and be transferred to her as soon as, the 
neutral limit is passed, o i  at some not remote port, as thus the spirit of 
international law may be violated, and the letter and spirit of the municipal 
Act evaded,” p. 542). In other words, you build on the Clyde a ship 
suited to bc R cruiser ; you arm her, not on the Clyde, but by arrangement 
at Dunkirk ; you commit no offence even if you, the builder, knew the 
design of your customer. I cannot say that the lair was put on a perfectly 
, rational and intelligible basis, but it was much altered., and the device 
which I have described was defeated by the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, 
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which made our neutrality law niore‘-rigorouj than that of any other 
country. I will not attempt to discus; in detail this complicated and 
obscure measure. It is enough to s ly  that it makes penal and visits with 
fine or imprisonment a larger number of ill-defined offences ; for esample, 
the building or agreeing to build any vessel, despatching, causing or 
allowing to be despatched any vessel with intent or knowledge, or reason- 
able ground for believing that the same shaIl be eniptoyed in the iiaval 
or military service-of a foreign Statc at war with another State, friendly to 
England. So wide is the scope of the Act that it includes tlie manu- 
facturing a submarine cable intended to be used for military purposes ; the 
helping to tow a prize into the.port of a belligerent,and, I am inclined to 
think, the supply of coal to a belligerent vessel beyond what is alloived 
by the courtesy and usages of nations. Adding to the number of guns or 
changing those on bonrd o r  adding to thc equipment-a comprehensive 
term as defined by the Act-is punishable in like manner. Contrary to 
the spirit of our criminal law, the presumption of innocence is reversed ; 
the  burthen is .laid on the accused to prove that which the lirosecution 
must, in the ordinary course of English law, establish. 
This Act, as we all know, was the orrtcome of the complaints of the 
United States Gjvernment as to the defects of our neutrality Ian-, in 
a h v i n g  the escape of the “Alabama.” T h e  sequel of the controversy is 
curious. The  English Act of lS l9  (59 Geo. 3, c. GD) was based on the 
American Statute of 1818, but was, in several respects, more stringent. 
An eminent American lawyer, A h .  Bemis, has enumerated no fewer than 
ten points in which the English Statute of lS19 is more rigorous than 
that of the United States. As I have already explained, the Statyte of 
1870 still further increased the stringency of English law. But no change 
of any kind was made in the United States Statute. T h e  conscqucncc 
is that many things punishable here are not sc) according to American 
laiv, and, indeed, I might add, under most other legal systems $50. The 
fitting out of a vessel under circumstances similar to-those under which 
the “Alabama” was fitted out, ivould not be an offence under American 
Ian. ; it would certainly be punishable under the present English ,la\\-. 
T h e  essence of the offence, according to the American Statute, i: an 
intent formed in the neutral State to fit out, arm, etc.; the kno\rledgc or 
belief on the pxt’of tlie builder that the vessel which he constructs \viH 
be used against a friendly Poivcr will not sufice for a conviction ; such 
belief makes him no more a criminal than is a gunsmith who.sclls a 
pistol with good reason for believing that it will be used unlawfully. I t  
is othenvise according to the more rigorous English law ; reason- 
able ground of belief is the gist of the offence. T h e  English Act 
includes ur.der “military service” military telegraphy. T h e  .. American 
Statute does not expressly or by implication include anything of this 
sort. The  more severe standard may be the right standard, but it is 
remarkable that ire should voluntarily take on our shoulders, for the 
benefit of others, burthens which they do  not choose to bear. 
Our magnanimity-1 can scarcely say our prudence-goes further. 
As you are all aware, our ~Governmcnt undertook, by the Treaty of 
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Ivashington of 1871, to observe in the future three rules then formulated, 
and to bring them to the notice of other countries. We are required to 
“use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming or equippin!: within its 
jurisdiction any vessel which it (England or the United States) has reason- 
able grounds to believe is intended to cruise or carry on war against a Power 
iyjth which it is at  peace ; and also to use like diligence to prevent the 
departure from its jurisdiction of any’vessel intended to cruise or carry on 
lyar as above, such vessel having been specially adapted in whole or in part 
within such jurisdiction towarlike use.”’ Secondly: “Not  to permit or suffer 
either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the bnse of naval 
operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or 
augmentation of military supplies of arms, or the recruitment of men.” 
Thirdly: ‘‘ To exercise due diligence in its own ports and ivaters, and, as to 
all persons, within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the fore- 
going obligations and duties.” 
Many jurists treat them 
as unreasonably onerous to neutrals.’ But the proclamation.of neutralit; 
of last month, unlike the proclamations issued in the Russo-Turliish and 
Japan and China wars, recited thesc rules and enjoined all subjects to 
obey them. I am inclined to think that the Act of l S i 0  and the rules of 
1ST1, properly understood, do not go  beyond what is reasonable ; the 
theory that one State can never be responsible for the conduct of its 
subjects to another State, cannot be maintained ; neutrality which does 
not conform to the three rules fairly understood. may be very offensive. 
But it is more heroic than prudent to admit the esistence of these duties 
without insisting on or asking for reciprocity, or giving some esplana- 
tion of the sense in irhich we understand them. 
The  only occasion on which these rules were construed-at the 
Geneva Arbitration-they received an interpretation which every English 
lawyer repudiates ; an interpretation which nould make neutrality as 
burthensome as n-ar itself. Is it not rash to bind ourselves to ;I forin of 
words which arbitrators will probably, in the future as in the past, 
interpret to our disadvantage ? The preamble of the Declaration of Paris 
states “that niaritime law in time of war has long bcen the subject of 
deplorable disputes; that the uncertainty of the law and of the duties in 
such a matter gives rise to differences of opinion between neutrals and 
belligerents n-hich map occasion serious diniculties and even conflicts.” 
Such differences and disputes are more likely to be multiplied than 
diminished by promulgating rules which will receive as many meanings 
as there are interests concerned. 
I n  recent wars in which maritime opchtions have bcen carriedc on on 
a large scale, the chief controversies have turned on i h e  duties of neutrals 
to belligerents. Perhaps at no distant date the other side of the question, 
belligerents’ duties to neutrals, and “ the  high privileges” of the latter, 
to use Lord Stowell’s ironical phrase, will be studied more than they have 
bcen,at allevents in this country, thetraditionsof which have bcen in favour 
No other nation has adopted these rules. 
1 See  Rccrwe ric Droif Infcnrnfioizni, IS%, p. 1S9. 
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of magnifying the rights of belligerents. I t  is ivcll known that the late 
Lord IGngsdonn, on idiom fell during the Crimean War the chief 
burthcn of deciding on appeal prize cases, ivas of opinion that Lord 
Stowell had pressed too strongly the rights of belligerents; and Lord 
Kingsdown sought to moderate those doctrines. The  events of the last 
few weeks suggest several desirable modifications in the interest of 
neutrals. h neutral must be prepared to put up with many inconveniences 
froni operations conducive to the termination of a war. He cannot fairly 
murmur, for csamplc, if contraband intended for the use of one belligerent 
be captured by the other belligerent. nu t  it is plain-and the cvcnts.of 
the last few weeks remind one of the fact-that the present usages of war 
permit of acts which may profoundly injure the neutral witliout perhaps 
greatly aiding the belligerents or conducing to the close of hostilities. 
Recalling the effect on the price of nhcat here and elsc\vlicre, the far- 
spreading consequences of tlie rise caused by vague alarms of capture, 
conceive what would follow from a blockade, maintained even for .a few 
ireeks, of the chief American ports. Suppose that in a war between 
Germany and Riissia, the  ports of tlic latter \yere sealed, and that no 
wheat from Russia were procurable at  a time whcn harvests in America 
antl other countries usoally supplying us with wheat were bad, would all 
neutrals consent to starve in order that the ring might be kept for the 
combathnts and the game, of war be played out in the good old ivai ? 
\\rould not such a strict assertion of the laws of war by belligerents 
become unendurable by neutrals ? For the common benefit of civilisation, 
the maintenance and use of certain machinery, plant, and services arc 
necessary. Such, for example, is the free passage at  all times to tlic 
ships of all nations through~an interoceanic canal such as the Suez Canal, 
which has accordingly been neutraliscd. The working plant of the 
modern civiliscd world includes many other things, notably mail-steamers 
and telegraph cables; and as to these a serious conflict betmeen the 
interests of neutrals and belligerents seems imminent. A mail-steamer 
conveying part of the .correspondence of a ivholc continent meets with 
the cruiser of a belligerent. Is she to be stopped, taken into a port of 
the bclligcrent, her cargo rummaged, some of it confiscated, her mail- 
bags broken open antl the letters examined ? XI1 that is within the 
rights of the belligerents as laid down in books; and a n-eal; neutral 
would no doubt put up with sucli acts. X strong neutral might make 
their repetition a casiis Lelli. 
The treatment of submarine cables in time of war is n still more 
diflicult antl important question, and one as to which international law 
has so far failed to give any clear guidance. No one can say with con- 
fidence what will be its development as to this point. I n  earlier wars 
questions arose as to the transmission of infomiation, particularly in 
the form of despatches from belligerents by means of vessels of neutrals. 
T h e  incidents which Lord Stondl  had to discuss in our conflicts with 
France were such as these : despatches sent from a belligerent Govern- 
ment in a neutral vessel from a hostile port to a consul of the enemy 
resident in the neutral country; despatches from an agent of the enemy 
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found 011 board a neutral vessel going from a neutral port to a port of 
tile enemy; despatches on board a neutral vessel from the governor of 
a colony of the belligerent to the govcrniiient of the mother country.’ 
~ 1 1  such despatches n-ere viewed by our Prize Courts as contraband of 
tile \yorst kind, their carriage “ a n  act of the  nmst noxious and hostilc’ 
Intiire.” ‘ 
These decisions throw scanty light on the problems nhich now 
confront us. In the event of a war between France and Germany. 
lnessages directing military operations in some of the colonies of the 
fernier country must be convcyed through neutral territories. Would the 
Ile~itral permitting or assisting in the transmission of such messages or 
tlespatches be blamable .? In  view of certain authorities, such conduct 
l ~ o ~ ~ l d  be unneutral and unfricndly. And yet what is the alternative? Is 
the neutral to act as censor and transmit this message and withhold that ? 
It  is alleged that in the French colony of AIartinique, messages apprising 
the Ainericans of the arrival of the Spanish fleet were detained by the 
French authorities ; and that complaints on this score have been made by 
the United States Government. \\'auld such conduct be deemed a 
breach of neutrality?, How is a neutral State to satisfy both belligerents 
-not to allo\v its territory to be used as a nicans of carrying out or 
directing military operations, antl yet not pursue a n  unfriendly policy ?3 
’There is, too, the qiiesrion of the cutting of submarine cables by 
belligerents. An international convention was entered into at I’aris 011 
Xarch l.lth, 1SS4, for the protection of telegraphic communication by 
means of submarine cables. But Article 15 of the Congress expressly 
states that the Convention is not to interfere with belligerents, rights. 
I’robably effectual safety against the danger here referred to is to be 
found in the  multiplication of lines of communication. nut pending. 
extensive developments of telegraphic enterprise, it is hard to contemplate 
calmly the possibility of England being cut off from India or some of her 
Colonies, not by her enemies, but by a State professing to be friendly to 
her in order to injure some other State. I am not now referring to the  
probability that in time of war our adversary n-odd endeal-our t o  sever 
our communication with India and our Colonies. Ah. Charles Bright, 
the nell-kno\vn engineer, in his recently-published book on submarine 
telegraphs, points out that :-“ I n  the event of a great war between this 
country antl another naval Power or Powers, it is quite conceivable that 
more than one of our Neditcrrancan cables (if no others) might be ruth- 
lessly cut by the enemy, or our communications with Egypt, India, and 
other Eastern and Australasian possessions entirely broken off.” .The 
same authority adds :-“?’he present lines to India and Australia are 3s 
Sce  271e illndisott, Edwards ?%j ; TIIe Rnpid, Edwards 278 ; The A f ( t Z n ~ ~ f n ,  
S e e  reniarks of Lord Stowell in The rlfhlniitn, p. 435. 
There is a furthcr contingency worth considering. 
G Rob., Ad. 440. 
T h e  vessels of a subjcct 
repeatedly cut a cable which is of grcat importance to B, a belligcrent, 
This question arosc 
of State 
engaged i n  war wit11 C. 
in thc Italinn-.l\b~ssiiiiaii \Var.-Revric r h  Droit Z d e r n n f i o n d ,  1S9G, p. GOG. 
II‘hnt is the responsibility of A ?  
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follows :-a, Lisbon, Gibraltar, blalta, Egypt, antl the Recl Sea ; 6, France, 
Italy, Greece, Egypt, antl the Red Sea ;  c, Germany, Austria, Turkey, 
Russia, and the Pacific Coast ; d, Lisbon and the West and East Coast of 
Africa. All these routes pass through foreign countries, and could a t  
once be interrupted in time of war.” 
The  peril which I 
suggest nil1 arise when w e  are at peace. The  reasoning to he found in 
the books on the subject of intercepting information likely to be  useful 
to an enemy is not applicable to modern methods of communication. I n  
the case of the ‘‘ Caroline,” Lord Stowell laid down the broad principle : 
“ I t  is tlie right of the belligerent to intercept and cut off all communication 
between the enemy and his settlements, and, to the utmost of his. power. 
to harass and disturb this connection, which is one of the declared objects 
of the ambition of the enemy (France) to preserve”; an  e~wAlent principle, 
if in injuring a belligerent no great harm bc done to an innocent 
neutral ; a questionable principle if in carrying it out an innocent neutral 
State is grievously wounded. 
I do not venture to offer a complete solution of a difficult problem ; 
perhaps none is possible. But it seems to mc that in any satisfactory con- 
vention should be an  article binding the signatories not to cut or injure 
cables connecting countries with their colonies or dependencies. 
That the strict enforcement of belligerents’ rights, as laid down in 
test-books, would be here ruinous to neutrals ; that the iiew international 
law slowly disengaging itself from precedents and traditions must here as 
elsewherc take greater notice of the interests of neutrals,-that is the 
reflection with which I end. 
Such a risk is one to be faced if we go to war. 
Major-General J. 6. STERLIKG :-The lecturer has given us  a lecture so full cf 
meat that it requires most careful consideration and digestion ; and in tlie limited 
time that isalloived, I think wisely, by the rules of our Institution, it is well for an 
individual speaker to touch 011 only one point in the hope of receiying further 
elucidation o n  a very difficult matter, and, it may be, a very serious one. The 
lecturer said that belligerents up to date have considered the interests of neutrals. 
Xow I am no! responsible for the stateinent that has appeared i n  the papers, 
which may or may’not be true-but it is certainly possibly true-that the sub- 
marine cable between St. \’incent and St. Lucia, two English colonies, has been 
cut by one of the belligerents, probably the Spaniards. The point is deserving the 
most anxious consideration.’ If that is allowable by international law there is no 
possible reason that the Atlantic cables from \’dencia to Halifax should n9,t be 
cut by the same Power. There is no difference of position between that and the 
cables from Gibraltar to Malta. I entirely leave apart  the question of cables that 
touch other people’s ground. Of course, the most difficult nut to crack is the 
question of i~Iarscillcs, whcrc there are sixteen cables running out ,  all belonging 
to different nations, interlacing one  with another ; and one of the people cmpl,oyed 
in the actual repairing of those cables told me lie frequently did not know wliich 
l?e had got hold of. But tliere is the case that between two English colonies, 
rilerely for a tactical or strategical advantage, to prevent the passage of one of 
tlie fleets past our colonies being signalled, the British cable between two of o u r  
colonies, neither end touching on  territory of one of the belligerents’ colonies, 
has  been, according to the statement, cut. I think it would be most valuable if 
our lecturer, ‘who has considered so many portions of the subject-matter of 
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tliis discussion, later on in his answering remarks. would give US some eluci- 
dation on this, which is a most grave and important question. 
H. F. WYATT, Esq. :-In the extremely interesting paper with which we have 
been favoured this afternoon, there is one particular point to which I would venture 
to draw attention. The lecturer spoke of the Declaration of Paris ,as having 
taken place under somewhat mysterious circumstances. Certainly that is true ; 
but in order to understand the new departure which the Declaration of Paris 
presented, I think he should have gone back two years. IIc should have gone 
back from May, 1856, to the evening of tlie 08th March, 1854, for upon that evening 
was published a supplement to the Official Gazette, in which was inserted a n  
announcement by the Government that neutral ships would cover enemy's goods. 
That announcement, which was styled a n  Order in Council, did not have appended 
to it the usual  words a t  the end, "By order of the Queen," and being styled a n  
Order in Council it was styled what it was not, for there was no meeting of the 
Privy Council between the Sth March and the L9th March. So that the origin of 
the suspension of the right of capturing an enemy's goods in neutral ships by 
England is shrouded truly in the deepest possible obscurity. I t  is a vital point in 
English history at the present time, it is  a point which remains uncleared up, and 
which will be  cleared u p  by some future historian ; but I hope that for all our 
sakes it will be cleared u p  soon. li'e all know that up t o  the OSth March, 1S54, it 
was deemed by England an essential part of its equipment in war that it should 
have the right t o  seize enemy's goods in neutral ships. W e  know, as Jfr. 
&Iacdonell pointed out, that we fought a great  war  in lSOl in order to ensure the 
permanence of that  right, that KC fought the armed neutrality league, and that 
we bombarded Copenhagen. I t  is very noticeable that by the exercise of this right 
we brought Russia to her knees in that campaign (of 1501) without any actual 
attack on the Russian Rcet. The attack on the Russian fleet which Nelson 
wanted to make a t  Revel and a t  Iironstadt was not necessary. Russia was 
brought to lier knees without it, because her commerce 'ceased. Coming to 
the present moment, we have to bear in mind that JIr. Chamberlain has 
recently said-and foreign papers have taken notice of the declaration-that if me 
had fought Russia about China we should have had no weapon by which to bring 
her to her knees. I venture to suggest to yo11 that we had a weapon, and that 
the weapon w a s  that the use of which mas suspended by u s  in 1854 and abandoned 
by 11s in 1S5G ; and that had w e  recently gone to war with Russia, and had we 
poxver to exercise this right of searching for Russian coninicrce in neutral 
bottoms, we could bring Russia to her knees in six months-we could 
checkmate her designs in Asia, we could defend t h e  frontiers of India, 
and make ourselves, and  not the Russians, predominant i n  China. At 
any rate, the lessons of our history distinctly teach this. As against that, 
Mr. JIacdonell observed that we should lose very much by insisting upon the 
right we prcviously fought for, that we should lose the porvcr of importing goods 
freely into this country during war. and we should-lose the power. of importing 
food. IX'ell, but consider, h o w  should we import the food from the foreign 
countries? W e  could import it only by giving up  the carrying trade ourselves.' 
ii'e cannot afford to give up tlie carrying trade oursclvcs. Commerce is the vast 
part of the means by which this country earns its living; and it is a gigantic 
change to contemplate, that tve should allo\v the whole carrying trade-including, 
that is to say, the carrying both of the goods coming into this country and the 
goods going from this country-to pass from 11s in time of war. In  the second 
place, the goods taken from this country could not be carried in foreign ships, for 
the simple reason that foreign ships to carry them do not exist. Our mcrcantilc 
tonnage amoiints to more than half the mercantile tonnage of the world. The  
Since, by the hypothesis, o w  comnierce would be carried on under neutral 
flags.-H. F. 1'. 
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othcr aggregate shipping of the world would be insuficient to g o  on nlaintainiog 
the trade it  docs now arid to do our own carrying trade as  ell. The  expedient of 
simply pnssing English ships under foreign flags the lecturer showed to be 
impossible, owing to the fact that such transfers would not be looked upon as  legal 
by foreign States. So that we come to this position, that the guid p r o  p r o  for 
which we are gi\-ing up this right of capture does not exist, that we are giving it 
111’ for:? chimera ; there is nothing substantial which we get  in return. U‘e could 
not afford to give u p  our carrying trade, antl it would be impossiblc.for us to do 
so in the actual event of war ; but \ye are  giving up a weapon by which in former 
\Tars we were able to take full advantage of in our maritime strength. It is ohjectcd 
that it is contrary to natural law to make war upon private property, but really 
the exercise of the right o f  capture is  simply upon these lin&s-that you prevent 
the neutral from extending his trade to your detriment. Sou do  not interfere with 
the ordinary or natural trade of the neutral, but you prevent Iiini from cstending 
the ordinary limits of his coninierce in a nianncr which would be dctriniental to 
you. Throughout our history, with the single exception ofthe Treaty of U’hitehall, 
made o n  August IWi, lGS’J, we al\vays construed our rights in that fashion. IVc 
merely want to prevent the neutral Power from extending his carrying trade, and 
so helping our adversary, the rival belligerent. This point is one of supreme 
importance to this country, in fact, i t  governs probably the whole future of tlic 
British Empire. If we do not make use of that right we are doomed to defeat in 
Asia a t  the hands of Russia ; if we do  make use of it, i n  all probability Russia is 
doonied to defeat a t  our hands. I t  was AIr. Richard Cobden who saw the full 
clTect of the exercise of the right of cnptiirc by ourselves. H e  said, “ It is clear 
that  Sature  herself has doomed Russia t o  a condition of abject and prostrate sub- 
jection to the will of the maritime Po\vers.” That is a strong expression of the 
conditions, but it sccms to h a w  been borne out by the effect of our war in 1SO1, 
an t l  a t  any rate, it h a s  to be borne in mind that th i s  right ot captiirc was given up 
in a most mysterious ant l  unauthorised manner in 1S54. I t  was suspended against 
the representations of a deputation of British merchants a t  the time n“ho waited a t  
the Foreign Office, and were told by Lord Clarendon that the niitiisters recogniscd 
the force of their arguments, but that  they felt they must give up the right because 
of thc hostility of Prussin to i ts  exercise. Finally it was abandoned, or temporarily 
abandoned-I hope only temporarily-in 1S3G, without authority of any kind ever 
heing produced. The Queen has, from that date to this, prrsistenf(y rcfitscd fo 
s < f p  the Declnmfio~r of P a r i s .  I t  has never been ratified by I’arliament, and  it 
reriiaitis a nlonstrous exercise of authority by men, Lord Clarendon and Lord 
Co\vley, who were cmpo\rered to do  one thing and did another. 
AIr. F. 11‘. I:AIIZES, Q.C., LL.D. :-One has heard a great  deal about the 
difficulties and about.what has happened with regard to the Treaty of Paris. 
I t  seems to me’, if I may venture to say  so, that  what has been the niisfortunc of 
this country in this case, and what is likely to be the misfortune of this country in 
another case which I will presently allude to, is that w e  a r c  in the unfortunate 
position of halting between two opinions. This country, the greatest iiaval Power 
on the face of the earth, was justified in endeavouring to enforce maritime lax 
with its utmost strictness ; this country, hs the greatest mercantile Po\ver on the 
face of the earth, is most k e d y  interested in the ocean bzinK free to merchant- 
ships a t  all times. Therefore, on  the other hand, you liavc what we may call the 
military and naval part wishing to preserve the laws of \vat- in their strictness as 
they were in 175G ; while, on the other hand, you have the mercantile conitnunity 
wishing to adopt the plan which the Americans wished to adopt in 1 S 3 ,  which, 
if  it had been adopted, would have placed merchant-1-essels under a n  arrangcnicnt, 
not exactly the sanie as the Treaty of Paris, by which property \vould have been 
as free from capture at sea as it is on shore. Between those two we have given 
up the one which \ v a s  useful to US as a .g rea t  naval Power. a n d  we have not got  
the othcr which would be useful to u s  as a great  mercantile Power. Xow, Sir, in 
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more recent times, and since the war with Russia, coal has become the factor of 
the very utmost importance in naval warfare. Hitherto,until today,  the worst wars  
which have h e n  fought have been land wars. Whether the Aniericaii civil wars 
or those between Austria and Prussia, Germany antl France, Russia and Turkey, 
Turkey and Greece, they have been fought by countries with a long land 
frontier, and all the great operations of war have been carried out on  land. 
Therefore, when a belligerent man-of-war has conic into a British port, thls 
is what happened : a belligerent man-of-war is not a very pleasant neighbour, 
and one would like to get rid of her as soon-as one can,  and it was thought, 
and agreed, among the nations pmerally, that the fairest and best way was 
to say to every belligerent man-of-war which canie into your ports, when 
you were a neutral, " W e  will give you just enough coal to take you to your 
nearest port, and nothing more." The rule worked fairly well ; the ports of the 
country were not very far from where they got  their coal, and they only g o t  
enough coal to go home, so that they could not pursue a n y  operations of war on 
their \vay-they had to g o  straight. But, unfortu- 
nately, that wliich was very fair in land wars has been adopted asa precedent and 
is now being put in force in a maritime war  in R way which I venture to think is in 
the immediate present most detrimental to this country-most detrimental to 
every neutral. If, indeed, we were the only nation on the face of the earth except 
the belligerents, we might well afford to let them fight out tlieir battles between 
theniselvcs, and when we said, " We will only let you have coal enough to go 
home with," it would be only coal enough for them to go home with, and the ships 
which got it would have to go  home, even if they had to  cross the Atlantic. But 
we a r e  not t l i c a d y  nation i n  thc world, and it seems to  me that the result of 
giving a ship enough coal t o  take it home when there are other nations who also 
have ports, is to enablc a ship to obtain coals to carry on the operations of war. 
Ii'ithout the coals they can do nothing ; with coals they can do everything-it 
makes tlie whole difference to them. With regard to the action of tlie American 
fleet in Manila Harbour, which one must look at certainly as being a very con- 
siderable achievement, if i t  is followed up, as i t  is likely to be, by the destruction 
of Mani1.i itself, that must necessarily mean a very grave injury to neutral 
property, to British property, and property belonging to other ' neutrals in 
Manila. I do  not suppose there is R sea-coast port on the whole face of the 
earth wliere, if it were bombarded, injury would not be done to British property 
and to all neutral property. And we supply the means of doing it by giving the 
ships enough coal to take them home. If Admiral Dewey's fleet had not been able 
!o take coal in a t  Hong-Kong they would never have ventured to g o  to Manila 
a t  all; they could not h+ve gone there with empty bunkers. Ii'hat is more, 
although having once coaled a t  Hong-Kong they cannot get  any more coal in a 
British settlement for three months, yet  Hong-Kong is not the only place out 
there. There is S$gon;belonging to France ; Macao, belonging to  Portugal ; 
Batavia, belonging to Holland ; Formosa, now in the hands of the Japanese ; and 
the whole coast of China itself-half-a-dozen different places, and yet every one 
of those direrent nations adopts the same rule as we a re  doing. 4fter an 
engagement you have only to go into another place, fill up your coal bunkers 
again-enough to take you I~ome  across the Atlantic to San Francisco, and, 
instead of going there, pursue tlie operations of war for another three months ; 
and then you can run  the gauntlet all round the places again, and so you go on. 
The result of that is that the furthcr away you a r e  from your base the better for 
you. You have nothing to do  but to send the coals out to meet you in some 
neutral port, fill up your bunkers there, and take care that you do not go into the 
szme port again, antl you can carry on the operations of \vat- nd 2;bitrrm. You 
a re  doing it by the action of neutrals who a rc  injuring their own property and 
their own rights by putting the enemy's ships in the position of being able to 
bombard the towns and destroy neutral property which they find there. I say that 
Tha t  was fair to both sides. 
YOL. XLII. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
CU
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 1
8:3
2 2
3 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
810 RIGHTS A S D  DUTIES OF RELLIGERESTS AND NEUTRALS. 
is a very dangerous condition of things, and  it would be a far better thing-and 1 
d o  not see that there is any  principle to prevent it-if there was an agreement 
amongst all neutral nations-and of course in almost every case the majority of 
nations are neutral, and therefore a re  the people to decide the question-that in 
no case would they give a belligerent ship one single ounce of coal d e n  they 
entered their ports unless it was enough to  boil the kettle and cook for the men. 
But what is the facr ? You say, ‘’ \Ire cannot allow you to take animunition, powder. 
or  anything to pursue warlike operations,” and yet you give them the thing 
without which all their powder and shot and everything else would be absolutely 
useless-you give them the one thing needful to enable tlieni to carry on 
the war; a n d  what must be the result ? The result must be injurious to every 
neutral who has property scattered about all over the world, and more injurious 
to England than to any other country, because her property is more yidely 
scattered and diffused all over the world. IVhere a similar statc of things exists 
on land what happens? O n  the 1st February, 1Si1, General Bourbaki’s army 
could not keep their ground. They had to cross the frontier and g o  into 
Switzerland, and before the Swiss woiild.give them a meal they required them to 
lay down their arms and be usclcss for the rest of tlie war. M’hat is the differe& 
in principle between that case and that of a belligerent ship which cannot keep 
the sea because she has no means of moving, and where she has to g o  into a port 
of a neutral? But instead of saying, “ S o ,  \re won’t give you coal; we tvill 
allow you to g o  out again, but we will not give you coal,” we practically say 
I ‘  Here is your coal, take it and proceed with your operations, but g o  somewhere 
else next time, and d o  not come again to an Englisli port.” It seems to me that 
in principle there is no difference a t  all. T h e  only t h i n g  was that in former days 
of course what the belligerent ship wanted when she came into a port was pro- 
visions, she wanted something to feed her people with, and shewas in hardstraits. 
She wanted food, and that we gave them, and away‘thcy went with it. And so 
tlie principle arose that they \rere treated somewhat differently from troops 
coming on  to the land of a neutral. But when it comes to giving them something 
which is tlie most important of all things for their warlike operations, it seems to 
me that the true neutrality is  to be fair to each side alike, and say, “ No, as far 
as we are  concerned neither of you shall have one single ounce of coal ifyou come 
into a British port.” 
Nr. J. XKDOSELL, in reply, said :-I have very little to say in reply to the 
observations which have fallen from the gentlemen who have addressed the 
meeting. There have been various classes of speakers. There have been 
“neutrals,” and “benevolent neutrals,” and “arnied neutrals,’’ but I do not 
think that in the discussion there has  been any belligerent ; so that really I have 
little to say in  answer to the criticisms which have been made upon the obsewa- 
tions \vliich I have addressed to you. With respect to the point made by the first 
speaker, I agree with him that it is a t  the present monient il crilical and momen- 
tous question. I should not like here to endeavour to propound any definite a n d  
detailed scheme with respect to an  alteration of the Convention of 1SS5, bat I do 
think that Article SIT. is based on a misconception. It seems to  me that Article 
XV. is  very much.like what would be  the state of things if two persons engaged 
in a quarrel said to a neighbour, I‘  I t  is necessary. i n  order that we should fight 
this quarrel out, that we should burn down your house.” The  third person might 
very fairly say, “ I a m  not interested in your quarrel ; I object to my house being 
burned down; and ifyou dowhat you say Ishall resent i t ,md take partintliequarrel.” 
Article Xi’. has, it seems to me, been evidently prepared by persons-and it was 
pardonable to prepare it in that  spirit in ISSZ-who had not present to them the 
dangers which we now find are  real and living. The second gentleman who 
addressed the meeting said that a cloud of mystery hung over the Declaration of 
Pa’ris of 1S.X. That is to a certain extent true, but I might call his attention to 
the interesting memorandum to be found in. the appendix to the Neutralisation 
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Commission Report, where he will find some clue to the motives which led to the 
promulgation of the principles of the Declaration of Paris of 1 S X  In my own 
vie\v, the real key is to be found in certain ideas ivhich Napoleon 111. a t  that time 
1 fail to see clearly the validity of the criticisms which 
He stated that, in his view, 
had w e  adhered to  the ancient principle of our maritime law it would be competent 
\v\.henever we happened, if we ever did happen, t o  be a t  war with Russia, to “bring 
that Power to  her knees.” I fail to follow that criticism, because, thinking over 
the facts of the matter, I do  not’see how by applying the old principie we c c u b  
seriously injure Russia. In the first place, her foreign tradein the past hasnever been 
great;  in the second place, her foreign trade now is  not large; and i n  tlie third place, 
if it ivcre much larger than I imagine it is, in all probability that \vould take place 
Xvhic11 we know, in point of fact, did take place in the war  with her, that tlie goods 
Xvhich, in the ordinary course of things, would have found their way by ships into 
Russia, would find their way through Germany and otherwise without very much 
alteration in the volume of the trade to Russia. Her tradc would be diverted but 
not necessarily diminished. Time will scarcely pcrmit me to go into many other 
interesting points which have been raised; but I would say, in ans\ver.to bIr. 
\\‘yatt, that  however excellent the ancient principle might bc, it is to-my mind- 
and I notice that that is the opinion which is gradually sl”eading-impracticable to 
resort to the old principle. I was very much struck by Dr. Raikcs’ interesting 
and, if he will allow me to say so, exceedinglporiginal suggestions. I sce great  
force in what he says. . I admit that  in some rcspects stopping the coal supply 
would be as likely as anything to stopping a war. But I hardly think tllat the 
scheme which he Itas promulgated upon this occasion would prove a working 
scheme. I hardly think it would obtain general assent.. I see, too, some instances 
in which it would work grave injustice. Ships which were in distress, ships which 
\yere in real want of coal, might be placed in a very awkward prcdicament by the 
proposed rule. Furthermore, it would operate as a preferential policy in favour 
of some Powers, and would be w r y  much to the disadvantage of others. A 
Power which had coal stores and coal bases all .over the  world would profit very 
much by this policy, and I am afraid that if the idcn were presented to other 
Powers less fortunately circumstanced, they would merely say :-“ \Ve see the 
cloven hoof: this is one of ‘the many instances in which, as in the past, England 
has cloaked her own private interests under so,nie specious and illusory phrase.” 
The C I I ~ I R > I : % S  (Sir R. Giffen) :-I am sure that I may say to Mr. Macdonell, on 
behalf of those present, that  we have listened with great  interest to his paper. As 
General Sterling kemarked, there is a great  deal of meat in it, and w e  have had a 
great deal t o  think about. The discussion has also been of such a character as 
to show there are  a great many points in it for consideration. We  must hope that 
a great deal of what has been said, both by Mr. Macdonell and by others, in the 
discussion will be considered in the right quarters. S o  more important paper 
could have been brought before u s  a t  the present time. 
veiy,niuch a t  heart. 
made upon Article 11. of the Declaration of Paris. 
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